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Criminal Courts and Tribunals
International Criminal Court
ICC Hands Down Acquittal in
Congolese Military Case
The International Criminal Court
handed down its second verdict and first
acquittal in its ten-year history on December
18, 2012, in the case of Mathieu Ngudjolo.
Ngudjolo, together with Germain Katanga,
faced charges of war crimes and crimes
against humanity with regard to acts in the
Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of
Congo in 2003. As of February 2013, the
Trial Chamber had not issued a verdict on
the charges against Katanga. In Ngudjolo’s
case, the panel of three judges of Trial
Chamber II found that the Prosecutor had
presented insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt Ngudjolo’s
responsibility for the attack on the village
of Bogoro. Those who viewed Ngudjolo’s
trial as a sign that the international community would hold accountable those
responsible for the atrocities committed in
the Ituri region see his acquittal as a major
setback. The outcome has also raised questions about the Office of the Prosecutor’s
ability to effectively collect and present
evidence in a court so far removed from the
crimes it tries.
The Prosecutor issued warrants for
Ngudjolo’s and Katanga’s arrests on June
25, 2007, and submitted the Amended
Charging Document in June 2008. On
September 30, 2008, Pre-Trial Chamber
I unanimously found sufficient evidence
to establish substantial grounds to believe
that Ngudjolo and Katanga had committed the crimes charged by the prosecution
and so the case progressed to be heard and
decided by a Trial Chamber. On November
21, 2012, Trial Chamber II severed the
charges against Ngudjolo and Katanga, citing evidence that changed the legal characterization of one of the modes of liability
for Katanga.
The charges against Ngudjolo, a
Congolese militia leader, allege his responsibility for the attack by armed forces
in Bogoro that resulted in the rape and
murder of more than 200 people, including children. Female survivors of the

attack on Bogoro were held in camps as
sex slaves after the attack. The Charging
Document indicted Ngudjolo and Katanga
under Article 25(3)(a) as principals who
indirectly co-perpetrated war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Article 25(3)
(a) provides that a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment
if that person “commits such a crime,
whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible.” The war crimes charges
fell under Article 8(2)(b) and comprised
using child solders, directly attacking a
civilian population, willful killing, destruction of property, pillaging, sexual slavery,
and rape. The crimes against humanity
charges fall under Article 7(1) and include
murder, rape, and sexual slavery.
The ICC’s standard of proof in Article
66(3) of the Rome Statute states that “in
order to convict the accused, the Court
must be convinced of the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt.”
According to Article 66, accused persons
are presumed innocent until proven guilty.
In the judgment, the three-judge panel
found that the prosecution failed this standard because the judges noted unreliable
testimony by three crucial prosecution
witnesses who could not definitively support that Ngudjolo was responsible for
the attack. Despite the ruling, Presiding
Judge Bruno Cotte added that Ngudjolo’s
acquittal “does not necessarily mean that
the alleged fact did not occur,” stressing
that the ruling did not put into question the
victims’ suffering.
Since the ICC announced its judgment, many human rights groups have
expressed grave concern over the Office of
the Prosecutor’s effectiveness in bringing
human rights abusers to justice. Geraldine
Mattiolo-Zeltner, International Justice
Advocacy Director at Human Rights
Watch, stated that, “given the judges’ comments on the insufficient evidence produced during the trial, [Chief Prosecutor
Fatou] Bensouda should speed up efforts to
improve investigative practices and prosecutorial policy.” The need to improve
investigations conducted by the Office
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of the Prosecutor does appear to be of
concern to Bensouda, who was elected in
June 2012 to the position and confirmed
her commitment to the cause at the ICC
Assembly of States Parties session in The
Hague in November. Without effective
investigation, prosecutorial practices, and
policy, it will be impossible for the ICC to
provide justice to victims of human rights
abuses worldwide.

ICC Appeals Chamber Confirms
Jurisdiction in Case Against
Former Côte d’Ivoire President
The ICC Appeals Chamber held on
December 12, 2012, that the Court has
jurisdiction to try former Côte d’Ivoire
President Laurent Gbagbo despite the
defense’s numerous challenges. Gbagbo
faces charges related to events surrounding his failure to step down after losing the
2010 presidential election. The Court confirmed charges on four counts of crimes
against humanity including murder, rape
and other sexual violence, persecution,
and other inhuman acts committed during
the post-election violence in Côte d’Ivoire
between December 16, 2010, and April 12,
2011. The confirmation of jurisdiction in this
case strengthens the Court’s ability to exercise jurisdiction in order to hold international
human rights violators accountable.
Gbagbo served as president from his
election in 2000 until his defeat by current
President Alassane Ouattara in the long
overdue elections of November 28, 2010.
Gbagbo refused to accept defeat, leading
to protracted violence throughout Côte
d’Ivoire until April 2011, when President
Ouattara finally took power with the help
of French and United Nations forces. The
violence by both sides led to 3,000 deaths
and nearly one million displaced civilians.
The ICC Prosecutor requested authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate
his own investigation into the situation in
Côte d’Ivoire in June 2011. The Chamber
granted his proprio motu investigation
request in October 2011, and the Court
issued the warrant for Gbagbo’s arrest
on November 23, 2011. Gbagbo is being
charged individually as an indirect coperpetrator of the attacks against civilian
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Ouattara supporters that the prosecution
argues were committed by forces acting on
his behalf. After his arrest in April 2011,
Gbagbo was held under house arrest in
Côte d’Ivoire until his extradition to The
Hague in November 2011.
The Pre-Trial Chamber categorically
rejected all challenges to the Court’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that Côte d’Ivoire
is not a formal State Party to the Rome
Statute. The Chamber based its jurisdiction
on a declaration made by Côte d’Ivoire in
2003 that recognized the Court’s jurisdiction for actions that occurred from 2002
to 2003 pursuant to Article 12(3) of the
Rome Statute.
On August 21, 2012, Gbagbo appealed
the decision to the Appeals Chamber
on ten different grounds. The first two
grounds dealt with the appropriateness
of Côte d’Ivoire’s participation as a nonState Party in the Pre-trial Chamber’s
review of the jurisdictional challenge. The
Appeals Chamber found that the PreTrial Chamber had erred in not issuing a
separate decision on the request for leave
to file submissions, thereby not allowing Gbagbo or the Prosecutor to respond
to Côte d’Ivoire’s submissions. However,
Gbagbo failed to demonstrate how that
error materially affected the decision and
the Chamber therefore rejected the first two
grounds of appeal.
Grounds three through five related to
the interpretation of Article 12(3) and the
declarations made by Côte d’Ivoire in relation to Article 12(3). On April 18, 2003,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Côte
d’Ivoire submitted a declaration to the
Court accepting the Court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 12(3) “for the purposes
of identifying, investigating and trying
the perpetrators and accomplices of acts
committed on Ivorian territory since [the]
events of 19 September 2002.” Gbagbo
challenged the scope of this declaration,
arguing that it only gave the Court jurisdiction over events that occurred before the declaration was made. The Appeals Chamber,
looking to the text and purpose of Article 12,
found that there was no temporal limit on the
jurisdiction submitted to by the 2003 declaration, and that the wording suggested explicit
consent to jurisdiction with respect to crimes
committed after the declaration.
Grounds six through ten of Gbagbo’s
appeal claimed the Pre-Trial Chamber
had erred in addressing his argument that

his fundamental rights had been violated
to the extent that the Court should not
exercise its jurisdiction over him. These
claims were based on alleged violations of
Gbagbo’s fundamental rights from his arrest
by domestic authorities on April 11, 2011,
until his transfer to The Hague on November
29, 2011. The Appeals Chamber quickly
denied these five grounds within the meaning of Article 82(1)(a) of the Rome Statute
as not referring to a decision with respect
to jurisdiction. Article 82(1)(a) gives either
party the ability to appeal a decision with
respect to jurisdiction or admissibility.
The significance of the Appeals
Chamber confirmation of jurisdiction in
this case cannot be overstated given that
Côte d’Ivoire is not a Member State and
that the Prosecutor initiated the investigation proprio motu. Of the eight situations
the Court has investigated, the Prosecutor
initiated two, Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire. In
four of the eight situations, the State Party
initiated the investigation. The United
Nations Security Council initiated the two
remaining situations in Darfur and Libya.
Proprio motu investigations give the Court
the ability to act independent from global
politics to hold states accountable. While
state sovereignty is a recognized and central right in modern world politics, the
ICC’s independence and corresponding
ability to effectively prosecute impunity
and enforce accountability requires that it
be able to exercise jurisdiction in a broad
array of circumstances. Despite limited
state consent and non-party status of the
state in question, a confirmation of the
Prosecutor’s ability to initiate investigations may have broad ramifications for the
potential scope of future investigations.
Tracy French, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, is a staff writer for the Human
Rights Brief.

Internationalized
Criminal Tribunals
With End in Sight for Rwandan
International Criminal Tribunal,
Questions of Jurisdiction,
Procedure, and Public Perception
Remain
The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR, the Tribunal) convicted
Augustin Ngirabatware, a former government minister, of genocide, incitement
60

to commit genocide, and extermination
and rape as crimes against humanity on
December 20, 2012. Ngirabatware was
sentenced to 35 years in prison for his role
in orchestrating the Rwandan genocide
as Planning Minister in the Hutu government. Ngirabatware was the last person
facing trial before the Tribunal, and when
the final cases on appeal are resolved, the
ICTR will close. The Tribunal has stated
that it must close by December 2014,
when all further cases will be transferred
to local courts in Kigali. Since its creation
in 1994, the ICTR has resolved 71 cases,
resulting in 92 indictments, ten acquittals,
and 32 convicted Rwandans who are currently serving prison sentences in Mali and
Benin. The ICTR will attempt to complete
the seven outstanding appeals involving
seventeen individuals before its closure
next year. The first appellate decision —
an acquittal in the cases of Justin Mugenzi
and Prosper Mugiraneza — was handed
down on February 4, 2013, and ICTR
President Judge Vagn Joensen predicted
that seven convicted persons will receive
appellate decisions during 2013, with the
remaining ten appeals to be decided in
2014. The United Nations has also stepped
up its search for nine alleged perpetrators of
the Rwandan genocide who remain at large.
The ICTR determined that local courts
have demonstrated their ability to fairly try
Jean Uwinkindi, the first indictee transferred to Kigali, justifying the transfer of
the remaining indictments for trial in local
courts. However, Uwinkindi’s case has
been stayed since his counsel challenged
the constitutionality of the transfer. As this
case is resolved, public opinion throughout
the international community will have
to act as a check on fair and humane
treatment of indictees by monitoring how
individuals are treated when they return
to their home country. Eight individuals
convicted by the ICTR, including those
who have been acquitted or who have
completed their sentences, have already
stated that they do not want to return to
Rwanda, but no other state has agreed to
accept them.
Despite the availability of local courts,
the ICTR has determined that if any of the
three most wanted indictees are captured,
they will be tried using a special international legal structure, the Mechanism for
International Criminal Tribunals (MICT).
One such indictee, Ngirabatware’s fatherin-law, Felicien Kabuga, is still at large
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and wanted by the international community for genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Kabuga is a millionaire
accused of funding the 1994 genocide
that killed one million Tutsi people. He
has a $5 million bounty on his head, put
up by the United States. Kabuga is still in
hiding, allegedly in Kenya, according to
ICTR prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow.
The two other most wanted indictees are
Protais Mpiranyi, former Commander
of the Rwandan Presidential Guard, and
Augustin Bizimana, former Minister of
Defense. While the end of its mandate
is in sight, the ICTR stated last month
that it will not relent in its search for the
remaining indictees, and has expanded its
search to other African countries outside of
Kenya. As the UN increases its resources
to apprehend the three most wanted indictees from Rwanda, there is a danger that
public perception of their guilt necessarily
follows, decreasing the chances for the
indictees, assuming they are apprehended,
to receive a fair trial either at the local or
international level.
The MICT, established by the UN
Security Council on December 22, 2010,
will assume the remaining functions of
the ICTR as it completes its mandate. It
will manage the archives from the ICTR’s
tenure, continue to protect witnesses and
victims, and hear all appeals filed after
June 2012, including a potential appeal by
the recently convicted Ngirabatware.
In the pursuit of justice, the public’s
perception of trials within Rwanda remains
of chief importance. International criminal
tribunals in general suffer a fair amount of
criticism regarding whether justice is truly
served by prosecuting individuals outside
of the country in which war crimes were
committed. Critics have also raised the
question of whether prosecutions executed
in an international tribunal promote or
contravene efforts of transitional justice.
As the ICTR closes and the execution of
justice is transferred to yet another external
tribunal, Rwandan citizens and the international community will be watching closely
to ensure that each indictee receives a fair
trial, that the State of Rwanda eventually
gains control over its process of transitional justice, and that justice is served.

Acquittals for Croatian Generals
Raise Questions about the ICTY
and its Legacy
The International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY, the Tribunal)
raised worldwide questions about the legitimacy of internationalized criminal justice
and the impartiality of the tribunal with
its recent acquittals of Croatian Generals
Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac. The
generals were sentenced to 24 and eighteen years, respectively, for committing
crimes of murder and inhumane acts
against Croatian Serbs during the war in
Yugoslavia. Both men were sentenced for
crimes that Croatian troops allegedly committed during Operation Storm, a largescale operation that began on August 4,
1995, and resulted in the defeat of the
Republic of the Serbian Krajina, a selfdetermined Serbian state.
Gotovina was a colonel general in the
Croatian Army and commanded Operation
Storm. Markac was the Assistant Minister
of the Interior and commanded the special
police in Croatia in 1995. In Gotovina’s
trial, the prosecution alleged that his shelling offensive killed 324 Serb civilians
and soldiers, and displaced almost 90,000
Serbs from a contested territory. Gotovina
and Markac appealed their convictions,
arguing that they did not intend to target
civilians. Judges overturned the ruling the
following year, with the majority granting
acquittal, due to a lack of evidence that
the generals intended to target civilians,
based on a totality of the circumstances.
Gotovina and Markac returned to Croatia
to a hero’s welcome, where they were met
in Zagreb’s main square by tens of thousands of people singing nationalist songs
and waving flags.
The Appeals Chamber rendered the
acquittals when, upon review of the trial
court’s decision, it found a number of
mistakes in the verdicts. ICTY Chief
Prosecutor Serge Brammertz pointed out
that the acquittals were issued after the
appeals judges “assess[ed] the evidence on
the record in its totality and [gave] appropriate deference to a trial chamber’s factual
findings.” Many critics of the Gotovina
and Markac acquittals cite the dissenting opinions of Judges Fausto Pocar and
Carmel Agius. These dissents, however, do
not have widespread legal traction because
of their harsh tone and misapplication of
the legal standard applied in support of the
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conviction of engaging in a joint criminal
enterprise.
In December 2012, university students, joined by Minister of Justice Nikola
Selakovic, crowded around the Serbian
Parliament to protest the recent acquittals
of the Croatian Generals, asking for an
extraordinary parliament session to adopt
a resolution ensuring fair conclusions for
the remaining cases before the Tribunal.
In a June 2012 debate at the UN Security
Council, members maintained an EastWest split on opinions about ICTY rulings. While the United States, Germany,
and Great Britain wished to respect the
verdicts acquitting Gotovina and Markac,
Russia asserted that the decisions were
unfair, and China reiterated the importance of maintaining impartiality in internationalized judicial proceedings. At the
Security Council hearing, Serbian First
Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic
condemned the acquittals, pointing out that
no Croatian indictees have been convicted
for war crimes committed against the
Serbs, nor has any top Croatian or Bosnian
official been charged, despite common
belief that all parties committed crimes
during the conflict beginning on June 25,
1991, throughout the former Yugoslavia.
Croatian Ambassador to the United
Nations Ranko Vilovic, however, stated
that although Croatians may be frustrated that individuals who committed war
crimes are not being held to the same
account as the criminal organization of the
Croatian authorities, they are not justified
in questioning the validity of the verdicts.
Many Serbs do not feel the ICTY is serving justice, and this feeling may increase
the divisive ethnic divide between the
Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and intensify feelings of victimization, vindication, and persecution. Brammertz claimed
that those affected by Operation Storm
feel that the international community has
not recognized their suffering. According
to Brammertz, because justice is being
served one-sidedly, this process, which
should be characterized by transition and
healing, will more likely serve as ammunition for future conflicts.
When the ICTY’s mandate ends in
the coming year, its legacy will leave the
international community with a number
of difficult questions: What has been the
purpose of the ICTY? Whose justice has
it served? Can internationalized criminal
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tribunals truly contribute to the transitional justice process? How will the lessons learned from this tribunal inform
future tribunals or alternative methods of
post-conflict criminal justice? In Syria,
although protracted conflict is ongoing,
civil society groups and the international

Judgment Summaries:
International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda
The Prosecutor v. Ildephonse
Hategekimana, Appeals Judgment,
Case No. ICTR-00-55-A
On May 8, 2012, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment in the
case against Ildephonse Hategekimana,
dismissing each of the Defense’s seven
grounds of appeal. Hategekimana, a lieutenant in the Rwandan army who commanded soldiers at the Ngoma Military
Camp in the Butare Prefecture during
the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, was initially convicted on December 6, 2010,
on several counts of genocide and crimes
against humanity and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The Appeals Chamber
affirmed each of his convictions and his
term of imprisonment.
Hategekimana’s first ground for
appeal alleged that the Trial Chamber
violated his right to a fair trial. This
challenge involved a number of claims,
including a charge that his presumption of innocence was violated when the
Tribunal chose to display, in the building
where Hategekimana was being tried, a
drawing by a twelve-year-old who was
one of the winners of an “Essays and
Drawings” contest held by the ICTR.
This particular drawing depicted a judge
pointing his finger at a defendant and
saying the words: “You Hategekimana…
tell what you have done in genocide.
You, Hategekimana you will go in prison
30 years.” The defendant in the picture
is saying: “I have killed 77 people.”
Hategekimana argued that displaying
this picture in the corridor outside his
trial room may have influenced the Trial
Chamber judges. He also pointed out that
one of the Legal Officers that contributed
to drafting the judgment against him was
on the jury that judged the “Essays and

community are already discussing the merits and methods of a Syrian ad hoc tribunal.
A tribunal, whether administered through
the Arab League or through the United
Nations, like the ICTY, would raise the
same questions for Syria and other nations
facing future periods of transitional justice,

including jurisdiction for international
criminal prosecution.

Drawings” competition. In response, the
Appeals Chamber held that, although
it was “highly improper” to display
the drawing, Hategekimana failed to
establish that the drawing would itself
be sufficient to create an appearance of
bias in the mind of a reasonable observer
who had been properly informed of the
circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the Appeals Chamber gave particular
weight to the fact that when Hategekimana
complained about the picture prior
to the public reading of the judgment
against him, the Trial Chamber immediately ordered the drawing removed.
The Appeals Chamber also rejected
Hategekimana’s claim with regard to
the Legal Officer, noting that the charge
was “based on the erroneous premise
that legal officers play a controlling
role in judicial decision-making.” The
Appeals Chamber similarly dismissed the
accused’s other claims that his fair trial
rights were violated, including allegations
that the Trial Chamber breached his right
to be tried in his presence when it permitted Hategekimana’s Defense counsel to
deliver closing arguments in the absence
of his client after Hategekimana refused
to appear in court, and that the Chamber
“assumed the role of Prosecutor or witness” by posing questions to witnesses
from the bench.

in reviewing the relevant evidence to
produce a conviction. The Appeals
Chamber also dismissed several attempts
by the Defense to discredit witness testimony concerning the involvement of
Hategekimana and his men in the alleged
crimes, such as claims that questioned the
witnesses’ ability to distinguish between
Hategekimana’s soldiers and militant
groups such as the Interahamwe, and
witness testimony regarding the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crimes.
In rejecting these grounds of appeal, the
Appeals Chamber cited to the significant
deference allotted to the Trial Chamber
as the trier of fact to determine the reliability of and appropriate weight to be
given to witness testimony.

In addition to challenging his conviction on grounds relating to alleged violations of his fair trial rights, Hategekimana
sought to overturn a number of the Trial
Chamber’s findings on the ground that
the Chamber inappropriately evaluated
the evidence against him. In particular,
Hategekimana challenged the fact that
the Trial Chamber relied on hearsay and
circumstantial evidence to convict him
on several counts. The Appeals Chamber
dismissed these claims, and stated that “…
as a matter of law, it is permissible to base
a conviction on circumstantial or hearsay
evidence,” and determined that the lower
court had exercised sufficient caution
62

Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate
at the American University Washington
College of Law, is a staff writer for the
Human Rights Brief.

Hategekimana’s final ground of
appeal related to his life sentence, which
he claimed was inappropriate because the
Trial Chamber erroneously assessed the
gravity of his crimes and the aggravating circumstances, while disregarding a
number of mitigating circumstances put
forward by the Defense. The Appeals
Chamber began by disagreeing that the
lower court incorrectly assessed the gravity of Hategekimana’s crimes, finding
that the Trial Chamber aptly compared
his crimes to those of other accused
appearing before the Tribunal in the past,
while also taking note of the “inherent limitations” of comparing cases and
“specifically assess[ing] the individual
nature” of Hategekimana’s case. With
regard to aggravating factors, the Appeals
Chamber agreed with the accused that the
Trial Chamber inappropriately characterized Hategekimana as being “in charge
of peace and security” in the Ngoma
region and erred in concluding that he
was on the Prefecture Security Council,
both of which were factors found to
aggravate his crimes. However, given the
presence of other aggravating factors and
the gravity of the accused’s crimes, the
Appeals Chamber did not feel that these
errors had any impact on the “overall
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assessment” of Hategekimana’s sentence.
Finally, the Appeals Chamber determined
that the Defense failed to demonstrate
any “discernable error” with regard to the
Trial Chamber’s assessment of mitigating
circumstances.
William Xu, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this summary for the
Human Rights Brief. Katherine Cleary
Thompson, Assistant Director of the
War Crimes Research Office, edited this
summary for the Human Rights Brief.

The Prosecutor v. Karemera
and Ngirumpatse, Case No.
ICTR-98-44-T
On February 2, 2012, Trial Chamber
III of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR) issued its judgment
in the case against Edouard Karemera and
Matthieu Ngirumpatse, often referred to
as the “Government I” case. The accused
were convicted of direct and public
incitement to commit genocide, genocide, the crimes against humanity of rape
and extermination, and serious violations
of Article 3 Common to the Geneva
Conventions and of Additional Protocol
II. The Chamber also found both accused
guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide
but did not enter a conviction for that
count, finding it would be cumulative to
convict for that charge as well as genocide. Karemera and Ngirumpatse were
both sentenced to life in prison. Initially,
the case included two additional accused,
Joseph Nzirorera and André Rwamakuba.
However, proceedings against Nzirorera
were terminated because of his death and
the charges against Rwamakuba were
severed into a separate case.
Both Karemera and Ngirumpatse
played critical roles in the Mouvement
Révolutionaire National pour le
Développement (MRND), the ruling
party of Rwanda from 1975 to 1994,
and the Interim Government of Rwanda.
Specifically, Karemera served as both
the National Secretary and the First Vice
President of the MRND and was a member of the party’s Executive Bureau.
Following the assassination of President
Habyarimana, he became the Minister of
the Interior and Communal Development
for the Interim Government. Ngirumpatse
also served at one point as the National

Secretary of the MRND, as well as the
National Party Chairman and Chairman
of the MRND Executive Bureau. In
addition, the Chamber determined that
Ngirumpatse supported the creation
of the youth wing of the MRND, the
Interahamwe, and was the individual
in Rwanda with the most de facto
power, influence, and authority over the
Interahamwe during the genocide.
One notable aspect of this judgment is that the Trial Chamber found
Karemera and Ngirumpatse guilty of
genocide and the crime against humanity of rape based on acts of rape and
other sexual assaults committed by members of the Interahamwe, employing the
joint criminal enterprise (JCE) theory
of liability. The Prosecution had pleaded
these acts under two different theories
of JCE liability, the “basic” form of JCE
and the “extended” form. Under both
theories, the Prosecution must prove: (i)
a plurality of persons, (ii) the existence
of a common purpose that amounts to
or involves the commission of a crime
under the Tribunal’s statute, and (iii) a
contribution on the part of the accused
to the execution of the common criminal
purpose. The theories differ in terms of
the required mens rea. For the basic form
of JCE, the Prosecution must establish
that each member of the JCE acted
with intent to commit the charged crime.
Under the extended form of JCE, by contrast, the Prosecution must only establish
that it was natural and foreseeable that
the charged crime would be committed
in the course of pursuing the enterprise’s
common purpose and that the accused
willingly assumed the risk that the crime
would be committed. In the present case,
the Trial Chamber determined that the
accused participated in a JCE, the common purpose of which was the destruction
of the Tutsi population in Rwanda, and
that each accused contributed to the execution of the common plan. Furthermore,
while the Chamber found insufficient
evidence that the accused intended for
acts of rape and sexual violence to occur
as part of the common plan, it concluded that during a genocidal campaign,
a natural and foreseeable consequence of
that campaign will be that soldiers and
militias who participate in the destruction of the targeted group will resort to
rapes and sexual assaults unless restricted
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by their superiors. Thus, the rape and
sexual assault of Tutsi women and girls
by soldiers, gendarmes, and militiamen,
including the MRND Interahamwe, was
a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the JCE to destroy the Tutsis. The
Chamber was thus convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt that Karemera and
Ngirumpatse were aware that widespread
rapes and sexual assaults on Tutsi women
were foreseeable consequences of the
JCE to pursue the destruction of the
Tutsi population in Rwanda. Finally, they
willingly took the risk that Tutsi women
and girls would be raped and sexually
assaulted, as evidenced by the fact that
they continued to participate in the JCE
despite the widespread occurrence of
rapes and sexual assaults on Tutsi women
and girls.
Another interesting aspect of the
Chamber’s judgment is its findings
regarding the crime of direct and public
incitement to genocide. As the ICTR
has held in prior cases, a person may be
guilty of direct and public incitement
to genocide regardless of whether the
incitement leads to the commission of
any genocidal acts; it is sufficient that
the audience understood the incitement
as a call to genocide and the accused
acted with the requisite intent. Here, the
Chamber determined that acts amounting
to direct and public incitement to genocide were carried out in furtherance of
the JCE to which the accused belonged
on two separate occasions. First, it cited a
meeting that took place on May 3, 1994,
at the Kibuye prefectural office, which
was attended by several high-ranking
members of the Interim Government,
including Prime Minister Kambanda and
the two accused, and which was broadcast over the radio. At the meeting, which
took place shortly after a massacre of
more than 2,000 Tutsis in Kibuye, both
Kambanda and Karemera praised the
work of the Interahamwe and called
for the population to continue fighting the enemy. The Chamber determined
that, through their speeches and due
to their failure to condemn the recent
massacre of Tutsis, Karemera and others intended to incite the population to
continue killing Tutsis for the purpose
of destroying the ethnic group. Thus, the
accused both committed direct and public
incitement to genocide at the meeting:
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Karemera directly in his role as speaker
and Ngirumpatse under a theory of JCE
liability. The second occasion cited by the
Chamber was a May 16, 1994, meeting,
which was also held in Kibuye and also
broadcast over the radio. At this meeting,
Interim President Sindikubwabo thanked
the army and the people of Kibuye for
“restoring” peace, despite the recent massacre of Tutsis described directly above.
Given the context of the recent massacre,
the Chamber again found that the speech
was understood by the audience as a

call to genocide and, because President
Sindikubwabo was a member of the JCE
to which the accused belonged, both
Karemera and Ngirumpatse were convicted of direct and public incitement to
genocide based on JCE liability on the
basis of the speech delivered at the May
16 meeting.
Finally, in determining that the accused
should be sentenced to life imprisonment, the Chamber cited the gravity of
the accused’s crimes, their positions of
authority in the Interim Government, and

the fact that there were no mitigating circumstances significant enough to justify
mitigation of the sentence.
Alli Assiter, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary for
the Human Rights Brief. Chante Lasco,
Jurisprudence Collections Coordinator
at the War Crimes Research Office, and
Katherine Clearly Thompson, Assistant
Director of the War Crimes Research
Office, edited this summary for the
Human Rights Brief.
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